PER CURIAM.

On May 8, 2009, Petitioner, Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, Heung Sik Park. The petition alleged violations of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (MLRPC) arising out of Respondent's representation of Chae Hong Min and his wife, Kyung Min, in the filing of an Application for Permanent Residence Status, an Application for Employment Authorization, and other immigration-related services. The petition charged Respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1 (competence);1 1.3 (diligence);2 1.4 (communication);3 1.16 (declining or terminating representation);4 8.1 (bar admissions and disciplinary matters);5 and, 8.4 (misconduct).6

We issued an order, in accordance with Rule 16-752(a),7 designating the Honorable John Hennegan of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to hear evidence on the matter and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. After several unsuccessful attempts by Petitioner to obtain personal service on Respondent, a copy of our order, Bar Counsel's petition, and a writ of summons issued by the hearing judge were delivered to an employee designated by the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland to act as Respondent's agent for receipt of service, pursuant to Rule 16-753.8 When Respondent subsequently filed no answer or response to the petition, Petitioner moved for an Order of Default. The hearing judge granted the order on October 22, 2009 and sent a Notice of Default to Respondent on November 6, 2009. Respondent filed nothing in response.

On December 11, 2009, the court conducted a hearing on the matter. Respondent did not appear at the hearing. Pursuant to Rule 2-323(e),9 all averments in Bar Counsel's petition were deemed admitted. Petitioner also offered into evidence the testimony of William M. Ramsey, an investigator it employed; Kyung Min, Respondent's former client; and a binder of documents relating to the representation. Respondent, not present, offered no evidence.

Following the hearing, Judge Hennegan found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent had violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1, and 8.4.

I.

Judge Hennegan made a number of findings of fact, which we summarize as follows: On or about May 25, 2007, Respondent was retained by Chae Hong Min and his wife, Kyung Min, to file, on Mrs. Min's behalf, applications for permanent residence status, employment authorization, and other immigration benefits. Respondent charged a flat fee of $1,200, plus $1,365 for application costs, which the Mins paid on or about May 25, 2007. Respondent notified the Mins in June 2007 that their applications were complete, and, shortly thereafter, the Mins executed the applications. In July 2007, Respondent communicated to Mrs. Min that there were no issues with the applications.

Mrs. Min received a notice from immigration authorities on or about September 7, 2007. She attempted to contact Respondent, but was unable to speak to him until sometime in October 2007. In October 2007, Respondent told Mrs. Min that she would receive her work permit within 30 days. Mrs. Min did not receive her permit. Additionally, Respondent received a request for information from immigration authorities on October 11, 2007. Respondent did not inform the Mins about the request for information and he did not respond to the request.

The Mins received another notice from immigration authorities in February 2008, and they spoke to Respondent on or about February 14, 2008. Respondent promised to contact the immigration authorities and update the Mins on the status of their applications. He did not follow through on his promise. The Mins were unable to contact Respondent again until March 2008, despite leaving phone messages and calling a second phone number Respondent had provided to them, but that number was not in service the following day. When Mr. Min spoke to Respondent in March 2008, Respondent said that he was having personal problems, but would contact the Mins and provide more information about the case. Respondent did not provide the requested information. The Mins made several subsequent attempts to communicate with Respondent, through telephone message and a visit to Respondent's office in person, during regular business hours. At that visit, they were informed by an employee of a nearby office that Respondent was rarely in his office.10 Despite these efforts, Respondent did not respond to the Mins.

Mrs. Min eventually filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain her applications' Notice of Decision. The notice informed Mrs. Min that her applications were denied because the requested information had not been forthcoming.

Mr. Min filed a complaint with Bar Counsel, which was received on or about June 13, 2008. Bar Counsel sent Respondent notice of the complaint and a request for written responses within fifteen days of June 17, 2008. In a letter dated July 10, 2008, Respondent wrote that his personal troubles and severe depression caused him not to follow up with the Mins' representation. Respondent also included some, but not all, of the immigration documents relating to the representation. Respondent wrote that he could not locate the remaining documents and indicated he would continue to respond to the complaint.

Bar Counsel sent Respondent a second letter on or about July 25, 2008, indicating that the case had been docketed and asking how long Respondent would need to complete his response. Respondent did not respond to this letter. Bar Counsel sent a third letter to Respondent on August 8, 2008, which indicated that Mr. Min had requested additional information regarding his case. Bar Counsel asked Respondent to provide the requested information within ten days of the letter. Respondent, again, did not respond to this letter.

Bar Counsel's attempts to contact Respondent through its investigator, William M. Ramsey, were unsuccessful. Investigator Ramsey visited Respondent's office and home and left business cards in Respondent's home's door and mailbox, but Respondent did not respond. Investigator Ramsey was unable to contact Respondent on the telephone.

Based on the foregoing facts, the hearing judge drew, by clear and convincing evidence, the following conclusions of law:

II.

This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings in Maryland. In our independent review of the record, we accept the hearing judge's findings of fact as prima facie correct unless shown to be clearly erroneous, and we review de novo the hearing judge's conclusions of law. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 314-15, 44 A.3d 344, 354 (2012).

Neither Petitioner nor Respondent filed exceptions to Judge Hennegan's findings of fact or conclusions of law, and Respondent did not appear at oral argument before this Court. Judge Hennegan's factual findings are therefore "established for the purpose of determining the appropriate sanction." Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A). With respect to Judge Hennegan's conclusions of law that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), we agree, for the reasons that follow.

MLRPC 1.1 requires that an attorney provide competent representation, which requires thoroughness and preparation. Although Respondent filed the applications for immigration benefits on Mrs. Min's behalf, he failed to demonstrate the proper level of thoroughness and preparation. The applications he submitted contained insufficient supporting evidence. Respondent exacerbated that error by failing to respond to the request from the U.S.C.I.S. for more information, despite his knowledge thereof. This failure ultimately led to the denial of Mrs. Min's applications. Such conduct demonstrates a lack of competency demanded by MLRPC 1.1. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Kwarteng, 411 Md. 652, 658, 984 A.2d 865, 868 (2009) (agreeing with the hearing judge's conclusion that the respondent attorney was incompetent, in part for failing to prepare responses to discovery requests and failing to preserve the client's right of appeal).

MLRPC 1.3 requires that an attorney act with "reasonable diligence and promptness." Respondent's conduct of wholly ignoring the requests for more information sent by U.S.C.I.S., information which was necessary to complete Mrs. Min's applications, also violated MLRPC 1.3. It is axiomatic that the failure to respond timely to requests for necessary information from an adjudicating agency demonstrates a lack of reasonable diligence. See, e.g., Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Tinsky, 377 Md. 646, 651, 835 A.2d 542, 544 (2003) (concluding that attorney's failure to supply additional materials requested by the court demonstrated a lack of diligence). Moreover, Respondent's failure to keep the Mins informed as to the status of the applications and his failure to respond to the Mins's inquiries both violate MLRPC 1.3. See Kwarteng, 411 Md. at 658, 984 A.2d at 868-69 (concluding that attorney violated MLRPC 1.3 by failing to communicate with and abandoning his client).

MLRPC 1.4 requires that an attorney keep his/her client reasonably informed about the subject of representation and respond to requests for information in a prompt manner. Respondent failed to abide by these dictates, as well, by his failure to inform Mrs. Min about the request for additional information and, ultimately, that her applications had been denied. Despite repeated attempts to contact Respondent, the Mins were unsuccessful. Therefore, Respondent's conduct has also violated MLRPC 1.4. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534, 554, 16 A.3d 181, 193 (2011) (concluding that attorney violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to respond to his clients' letters and messages, to inform a client that his case had been dismissed, to inform clients that he had moved his practice, and to provide the client with new contact information).

MLRPC 1.16(d) requires an attorney to take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client's interest upon terminating representation. Respondent, however, violated these mandates. Respondent terminated his representation of Mrs. Min by abandoning the matter before completion, failing to respond to Mrs. Min's messages, failing to provide sufficient contact information, and failing to inform of his intent to move (or close) his office. Moreover, he failed to refund any of the unearned fees and to return Mrs. Min's paperwork. See De La Paz, 418 Md. at 555, 16 A.3d at 193-94 (concluding that attorney violated MLRPC 1.16(d) by failing to inform clients that he was moving his practice, to return a client's file and refund unearned fees).

MLRPC 8.1(b) provides that an attorney must respond to lawful demands for information from the disciplinary authority. Respondent, multiple times, ignored Bar Counsel's letters to him, which specifically requested a response to the allegations. Moreover, Respondent ignored attempts of the investigator to communicate with Respondent about the allegations. The failure to respond to Bar Counsel's inquiries with respect to its investigation of a disciplinary matter clearly violates MLRPC 8.1(b). See, e.g., Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 174, 994 A.2d 928, 944 (2010) (attorney violated MLRPC 8.1 by "fail[ing] to respond to repeated written requests for information from Bar Counsel.").

Lastly, MLRPC 8.4(d) establishes that it is professional misconduct to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Respondent's failure to pursue Mrs. Min's applications diligently and competently, as well as his failure to maintain sufficient communication with Mrs. Min, as demonstrated by our conclusion that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4, constitutes conduct that brings disrepute to the legal profession, in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). Respondent's failure to respond to Bar Counsel's attempted communications further contributed to that rule violation. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Rose, 391 Md. 101, 111, 892 A.2d 469, 475 (2006) (concluding that the attorney violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by failing to respond "promptly, completely and truthfully" to Bar Counsel, to keep the client informed of the matter of representation, and to provide diligent representation).

III.

Having concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), all that remains for us to determine is the appropriate sanction for Respondent's misconduct.

Petitioner recommends disbarment as the appropriate sanction. Petitioner asserts that Respondent "betrayed the trust that his clients placed in him" when he failed to provide the legal services they sought, ignored their efforts to obtain information about their case, gave them misleading information about their case, failed to respond to the immigration service's informational requests, and failed to return the unearned fee. Citing our decision in Tinsky, Petitioner argues that disbarment is the only proper sanction for a lawyer who fails to provide competent and diligent representation, abandons representation, and fails to return unearned fees.

In selecting a sanction, we are cognizant of the principle that attorney discipline proceedings are not instituted to punish an offending lawyer, but rather to protect the public and the public's confidence in the legal profession. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Sucklal, 418 Md. 1, 10 n. 3, 12 A.3d 650, 655 n. 3 (2011). Imposition of a sanction protects the public in two ways: "through deterrence of the type of conduct which will not be tolerated, and by removing those unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls of those authorized to practice in this State." Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Usiak, 418 Md. 667, 689, 18 A.3d 1, 14 (2011) (quoting Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 268-69, 920 A.2d 458, 465 (2007)). Our selection of an appropriate sanction is guided by the nature and gravity of the violation, the intent with which the violation was committed, and the particular circumstances surrounding each case, including aggravating and mitigating factors. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Khandpur, 421 Md. 1, 18, 25 A.3d 165, 175 (2011).

Petitioner's recommendation of disbarment finds support in two cases in which we disbarred an attorney for misconduct similar to Respondent's. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brady, 422 Md. 441, 460-61, 30 A.3d 902, 913 (2011), we disbarred an attorney for violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16 and 8.4. The respondent in that case failed to take fundamental steps in furtherance of his client's interest by neglecting to file a response to a motion to dismiss and failing to appear at a scheduling conference. Id. at 457, 30 A.3d at 911. Furthermore, the respondent failed to keep his client informed about the status of the case in the face of the client's requests for updates, collected unreasonable fees, failed to return unearned fees, and terminated the representation without notice to the client. Id. at 458-60, 30 A.3d at 911-13. We held that such misconduct, amounting to the effective abandonment of a client, "was sufficient to justify disbarment as the appropriate sanction." Id. at 461, 30 A.3d at 913. Accordingly, we disbarred the Brady respondent. Id., 30 A.3d at 913.

Similarly, we disbarred an attorney for violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) in Kwarteng, 411 Md. at 660-61, 984 A.2d at 870. Like the respondent in Brady, we noted that the attorney in Kwarteng "in effect abandoned his representation of the complainant." Id. at 660, 984 A.2d at 870. Kwarteng did so by failing to prepare interrogatories, failing to respond to a motion for sanction, failing to preserve the client's right of appeal, failing to communicate with the client when the client repeatedly sought updates on the status of his case, and terminating the presentation by neglecting to pursue effectively the client's interests. Id. at 658, 984 A.2d at 868-69. Moreover, the attorney in Kwarteng violated MLRPC 8.1(b) when he failed to answer Bar Counsel's investigator's attempts to communicate with him. Id., 984 A.2d at 869. We held that the only appropriate sanction for such misconduct, taken altogether, was disbarment. Id. at 661, 984 A.2d at 870.

Brady and Kwarteng inform the sanction in this case. In the absence of mitigation (as here), disbarment is the appropriate sanction when an attorney abandons a client by failing to pursue the client's interests, failing to communicate with the client, ignoring a client's repeated requests for status updates, terminating the representation without notice by failing wholly to provide effective services, and failing to return unearned fees. Respondent did all of this and failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel's lawful demands for information, in violation of MLRPC 8.1.

Accordingly, we order disbarment.

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST HEUNG SIK PARK.